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Widespread recognition that economic inequality has been growing 
for forty years in most of the developed world, and in fact has tended 
to grow across most of the history of modern economies, shows that 
the period 1945-1973, when inequality of wealth and income shrank, 
was a marked anomaly in historical experience. At the time, however, 
the anomalous period of equality seemed to vindicate a long history of 
optimism about economic life: that growth would overcome meaningful 
scarcity and usher in an egalitarian and humanistic period that could 
almost qualify as post-economic. This has not been the experience 
of the last four decades. In this intellectual history of the anomalous 
period, we trace the main lines of that optimism and its undoing.
IntroductIon
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (henceforth C21)
at once produced and symbolized a new public awareness of economic 
inequality.1 This much is cultural history that we already know as cliché. 
Piketty’s work, for all its considerable virtues, was as much the book that 
the moment demanded as it was a book that shaped its time. C21 became an 
emblem of a new emphasis on inequality among “respectable” elites, who in 
recent years have shown signs of accepting a new intellectual dispensation, 
in which right-wing commentators generate their own accounts of inequality 
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1 Thomas PikeTTy, CaPiTal in The TwenTy-FirsT CenTury (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014).
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and (mirabile dictu!) democratic socialism has reappeared at the American 
electoral table to a courteous reception.2
C21 shows, so far without successful contradiction, that inequality of 
income and wealth has been growing in the developed world since the early-
to-mid 1970s.3 It also shows that economic inequality grew from the late 
eighteenth century until World War I, with the major exception to this trend 
(apart from the generalized disasters of the Depression and two global wars) 
being the three decades following World War II. In this era, sometimes called 
the “Golden Age of Capitalism,”4 inequalities in wealth and income shrank 
across the North Atlantic democracies and remained relatively compressed 
until the early 1970s. Then they began what has become a dramatic resurgence, 
particularly in the concentration of income and wealth at the very highest 
echelons of distribution.
Piketty’s argument was popularly associated with a “law” expressed in the 
inequality r>g,5 meaning that the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of 
economic growth generally (producing disproportionate accumulation to the 
wealthy, who by definition hold capital). This expression summarizes empirical 
findings across a great variety of settings, from the antebellum plantation 
South to the England of Jane Austen’s marriageable “incomes” to Silicon 
Valley, and is abstracted from any particular account of what produces the 
inequality (in both the algebraic and the macroeconomic senses of that word).
C21 therefore sends readers off in search of mechanisms. In what ways do 
the diverse economies that Piketty examines — most saliently, our own — 
produce, reproduce, and amplify inequality? Can we identify ways to intervene 
against inequality? Should these proceed through post-tax redistribution, 
or should they be aimed at the economic organization that allocates annual 
income in the first place, for instance through labor law or antitrust policies?6 
Piketty’s findings also invite differentiation among considerations that his focus 
2 Jedediah Purdy, Bernie Sanders’s New Deal Socialism, new yorker, Nov. 20, 
2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/bernie-sanderss-new-deal-
socialism.
3 See PikeTTy, supra note 1; see also David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 
128 harv. l. rev. 626 (2014).
4 See sTePhen marglin & JulieT sChor, The golden age oF CaPiTalism: 
reinTerPreTing The PosTwar exPerienCe (1992).
5 PikeTTy, supra note 1, at 354.
6 Jacob Hacker, The Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class Democracy, Pol’y 
neTwork (May 6, 2011), http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=
3998&title=The+institutional+foundations+of+middle-class+democracy.
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on aggregate measures of wealth and income subsumes: which dimensions 
or effects of inequality are most important, and why?7
Developing responses to these questions requires connecting the topic of 
inequality in the abstract, trans-historical formulation that enables Piketty 
to develop his comparative empirics with a pair of themes that account for 
much of the energetic reception of C21. First is the relationship between 
economic inequality and political democracy: how far does economic inequality 
undermine civic equality and democratic responsiveness, tending toward a 
merger of economic power and political power? Second is the relationship 
between economic inequality and the lives people are actually able to lead: 
the choices that circumstances present to them, the sorts of work they can 
do, the levels of security they can enjoy, and so forth.8 Many of the answers 
lie in the laws that constitute various economic orders.
The revival of these themes is also an occasion to understand their relative 
absence in recent decades from legal scholarship and legal culture more 
generally. This Article begins interpreting contemporary scholarship and 
practice as a product of the “Golden Age of Capitalism”: a period in which 
intellectual work was greatly influenced by the erroneous belief that the 
period of widely shared growth following World War II was a “new normal.” 
Problems of inequality thus seemed marginal, even resolved, and could be 
set aside (as distinct from problems of poverty — then widely understood as 
the persistent exclusion of a subset of the population from genuine economic 
and social participation). The thought shaped by that era’s presuppositions 
long outlived the empirical bases of their plausibility. Now the question is 
what will replace it.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we examine what 
we call, with due qualification, the “Golden Age of Capitalism.” Section I.A. 
sets out certain key intellectual premises that were widely shared during this 
7 See, e.g., John rawls, a Theory oF JusTiCe 90-95 (1971) (on the concept of 
“primary goods”: defined as those rights and resources that all persons have reason 
to value regardless of personal goals or life-plans); amarTya sen, inequaliTy 
reexamined 12-30 (1992) (addressing the question which dimensions of inequality, 
in respect to which resources and capacities, should be of greatest concern from 
a welfarist perspective). 
8 Piketty comments en passant in C21 on both topics, expressing concern for a 
broadly defined “democracy” (which he sometimes seems to identify with a 
meritocratic careers-open-to-talent ideal). He also plays on nineteenth-century 
marriage comedies to argue that increasing levels of wealth inequality will 
direct ambition and energy toward currying the favor of the already wealthy, 
rather than developing one’s own capacities — toward, that is, a social order 
of courtship and patronage. See PikeTTy, supra note 1, at 404-29.
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period: that economic inequality would stabilize at a tolerable level, and that, 
if economic inequality did reach undesirable levels, an effective and legitimate 
state would be poised to correct it. Section I.B examines a specifically legal 
corollary of this optimistic view: a position that we call “legal liberalism,” 
which identified law’s role in social reform as chiefly that of providing 
adequate representation of all relevant interests within a scheme of fair 
procedures. In Part II, we locate Golden Age optimism in its larger historical 
context. Section II.A. sets Golden Age optimism in a hundred-year history 
of economic thinking that predicted that growth would overcome scarcity, 
a tradition of thought beginning in John Stuart Mill and continuing through 
John Kenneth Galbraith. Section II.B. shows how Golden Age optimism was 
eroded criticism from both left and right. The last Part concludes.
I. the Golden AGe of cApItAlIsm
Before we begin our discussion on the optimism and legal liberalism that 
characterized the “Golden Age,” it should be clarified that we use the term 
to refer to the period in which robust growth was widely shared, particularly 
among white, male workers. To be clear, we are alert to, and do not mean to 
play down, the many historical ironies and omissions in the use of this term, 
and we intend those ironies in invoking it. It was not a golden age for those 
who were excluded from its rewards on the basis of race, sex, or otherwise. It 
was not a golden age for much of the colonial and postcolonial world. And, of 
course, the sense in which it was a golden age is ambivalent: it was a golden 
age for capitalism in the sense that perplexities and conflicts long thought 
endemic to market economies appeared to many observers to have resolved 
themselves. For all of this, it is nonetheless true that this was also a period in 
which many working people enjoyed a degree of security, social standing, 
and leisure that was unprecedented in human history, and has since receded.
A. The Premises of Mid-Century Optimism
The Golden Age shaped thinking about the kinds of problems that inequality 
presents and the solutions to which it is susceptible. From political philosophy 
to public policy to law, much of the inherited intellectual framework in the 
United States and elsewhere in the Anglophone world reflects the assumptions 
of that period. Summarized alliteratively, these are the assumptions of 
economists Simon Kuznets and John Maynard Keynes.9 The first assumption 
9 For discussions of these premises of Kuznets and Keynes, see PikeTTy, supra 
note 1, at 13-15 (discussing the Kuznets curve), and Fred hirsCh, soCial limiTs 
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is the confidence that economic growth would bring a period of increased 
inequality, which would then decline and stabilize at a tolerable level. This 
assumption is crystallized in Kuznets’s tracing of income inequality via a set 
of twentieth-century U.S. tax returns.10 Soon matched by doppelgangers, such 
as the “environmental Kuznets curve,”11 the Kuznets curve became a kind of 
macroeconomic shorthand for optimism about the social meaning of economic 
growth. Growth would correct, in time, the problems that came with it.
Keynes stands here for the second assumption of the Golden Age: that the 
state had lastingly acquired the expertise, power, and legitimacy to manage 
economic life for social ends. Although the core of Keynes’s contribution 
to postwar economic governance was the management of business cycles 
through demand stimulus (via public spending or relaxed interest rates),12 the 
appeal of his thought rested on a larger image of political and social life. In 
this image, as Keynes famously put it, the “economic problem” (basically 
the problem of scarcity) was on the way to being solved.13
Taken together, the optimistic assumptions of Kuznets and Keynes implied 
that economic inequality would not prove self-accelerating and that, in any event, 
accumulations of private wealth would not undermine the basic operations of 
the democratic state, including its management of the economy. The violent 
intellectual and practical struggle between market order and political order 
had been resolved on terms of mutually beneficial peace, with the upper hand 
decisively belonging to a liberal-democratic state staffed by experts in political 
economy.14 These premises describe the common sense of the North Atlantic 
countries in the “thirty glorious years”15 following World War II, when high 
rates of growth, effective national controls on the international movement 
of capital, and a strong political role for organized labor resulted in widely 
To growTh 123-36 (1976) (describing the importance of this Keynesian premise 
to the viability of the mixed economies of the twentieth century). 
10 Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 am. eCon. rev. 
1 (1955).
11 Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 
110 q.J. eCon. 2 (1995) (arguing that pollution rises early in the development 
process, and then falls as wealthy societies adopt environmental regulations).
12 John maynard keynes, general Theory oF emPloymenT, inTeresT and money 
(1936).
13 John maynard keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in essays 
in Persuasion 358 (1963).
14 David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Neoliberalism and Law, 
77 law & ConTemP. Probs. 1 (2014).
15 Jean FourasTié, les TrenTe glorieuses, ou la révoluTion invisible de 1946 a 
1975 (1979).
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shared prosperity. There were important exceptions to the trend of economic 
inclusion, notably African-Americans in the United States, but it was typical 
of the time that these, like other pockets of poverty or social vulnerability, 
were regarded as exceptions, and the assumed solution among elites was to 
incorporate them into a system generally regarded as working for everyone.16 
This common sense implied that there was no great reason to expect wealth 
inequality to be self-compounding, and that, if inequality did grow, no reason 
that a democratic political order should not be able to sort it out.
Piketty’s findings allow us to recognize that both of these assumptions were 
generalizations from an anomalous period of widely shared growth within a 
politically tamed capitalism.17 While Piketty’s findings directly undermine the 
expectation of an increasingly or at least stably equitable economic distribution, 
they also direct attention to the role of the state and democratic feedback in 
mid-century optimism about equality. However, these assumptions continue 
to work on habits of thought, including thinking about political and legal 
action, which were enshrined in professional and institutional forms just as, 
ironically enough, their basis in fact was being undermined.
We begin with political philosophy, and at the end of the anomalous 
period of economic equality. Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva flies at 
dusk, that an age becomes self-conscious only as it ends, was perhaps never 
more poignantly true than when John Rawls published A Theory of Justice 
in 1971, shortly before the rapid decline of the Golden Age got underway.18 
Rawls devoted a bit more than three pages to “the fair value of political 
liberty,” that is, the problem of ensuring that formally equal rights to political 
participation should not be undermined by unequal economic power.19 He 
recognized the possibility that unequal political power might arise from unequal 
economic power, then entrench itself in the legal rules of both political and 
economic life.20 But his response rested squarely on the Keynesian premise: 
in its distributive capacity, government should re-sort wealth in an ongoing 
way to avoid excessive concentrations of economic power, while also using 
public financing of elections to protect the political process from colonization 
16 This assumption is at the foundation of Brandon Terry’s recent critique of 
Rawlsian political theory for relying on an optimistic narrative of the civil rights 
movement. See brandon miChael Terry, whiCh way To memPhis?: PoliTiCal 
Theory, narraTive, and The PoliTiCs oF hisToriCal imaginaTion in The Civil 
righTs movemenT (2012).
17 Jonathan Hopkin, The Politics of Piketty, 65 briT. J. soC’y 1 (2014) (emphasizing 
that Piketty’s narrative needs to be understood in a political frame).
18 rawls, supra note 7.
19 See id. at 224-27. 
20 Id. at 226.
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by private wealth. All of this appeared in Rawls’s thought as, in effect, an 
important administrative task for a postwar state that he assumed would have 
the power, expertise, and legitimacy to carry it out. Rawls offered no sustained 
reflection on the ways that unequal wealth might arise from within, or break 
free of, a basically social-democratic state, and then impose its own logic of 
power throughout both economic and political life. 21
Rawls wrote that if such questions arose, they would “belong to political 
sociology,” rather than to his theory of justice.22 In the context of the academic 
disciplines, this is a cogent division of intellectual labor. But the thought that 
a theory of justice could set aside problems of “political sociology” put the 
cart before the horse in one key respect. Rawls’s theory of justice owed its 
great appeal partly to its being able to presuppose a “political sociology” 
characterized by the assumptions of Kuznets and Keynes. Rawls’s thought 
presented an idealizing and rationalizing account of a certain kind of postwar 
state, one poised to manage economic life so thoroughly as to make economic 
processes objects of political choice and control, rather than allowing them 
to determine the agents of political power and change. Rawls portrayed 
the economy as the site of distributive shares that could be allocated by 
rules allowing only those inequalities that benefit the least advantaged.23 He 
treated the choice between socialism and private ownership as an open one 
in principle.24 To conceive of economic life in this manner requires assuming 
that economic life is basically a plastic object of regulation, not a source of 
barriers to, and disruption of, the political project of justice.
Because it rests on these (in hindsight) contingent assumptions, Rawls’s 
project represents the apogee of a body of thought that preceded the postwar 
period by many decades but came to its fullest flowering then. This line of 
thinking forecasted the diminishing importance of the distinctively economic 
domain of life: as scarcity receded with the growth of aggregate wealth, the 
constraints that scarcity had long imposed on economic life would also recede, 
opening new possibilities for economic and social order. 
21 Rawls returned to the topic of the fair value of the political liberties in John 
rawls, PoliTiCal liberalism 356-63 (1993). In this book, published twenty-two 
years after A Theory of Justice, he also sounded a note of concern about trends to 
inequality: “[T]he invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favors 
an oligopolistic configuration of accumulations that succeeds in maintaining 
unjustified inequalities and restrictions on fair opportunity.” Id. at 267. 
22 rawls, supra note 7, at 226-27.
23 See id. at 60-74.
24 See id. at 270-74 (comparing free-market and socialist economies, either of 
which might be implemented in a manner consistent with Rawls’s principles).
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B. Legal Liberalism
The principles of postwar political liberalism, of which Rawls was perhaps 
the preeminent exponent, did not stay sequestered in philosophical abstraction 
but influenced a generation of legal thought and activism. The defining 
tendency of progressive legal thought and practice in the late 1960s and early 
1970s crystallized intellectually and institutionally (the latter in American 
law schools, clinics, and litigation organizations) around a position often 
called legal liberalism.25 Legal liberalism was defined by its emphasis on 
the use of litigation and adjudication-like procedures to protect individuals 
against arbitrary discrimination with respect to their basic interests — that 
is, to ensure the formal preconditions of their full participation in political, 
economic, and social institutions. 
This agenda has as some of its signal achievements the dismantling of 
public segregation on equal protection grounds;26 the development of the 
constitutional doctrine of gender equality, which has pressed hard against 
laws treating men and women differently and influenced a new body of law 
advancing LGBTQ claims on grounds of both liberty and equality;27 and the rise 
of procedural preconditions, usually in the form of a right to a hearing, before 
loss of a legal interest in life, liberty, or property.28 This procedural requirement 
has been interpreted to include public benefits and public employment; the 
guarantee of due process applies to state provision as well as deprivation of 
more traditional interests such as chattel or bodily liberty.29 Across the country, 
the Legal Services Corporation and other poverty-law organizations provided 
representation for this sort of procedure, as well as for tenants in housing 
court, small-claims court, and other redoubts of procedural protection. Law 
students in clinical programs learned to do the same.30
25 sTeven m. Teles, The rise oF The ConservaTive legal movemenT 22-57 (2008).
26 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating Defense of 
Marriage Act substantially on equal protection grounds); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a state constitutional 
amendment that denied statutory antidiscrimination guarantees to LQB people); 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating on equal-protections 
grounds a policy excluding women from enrolling at a public military institute); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny of sex-
based classifications).
28 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing before 
termination of welfare benefits).
29 See id.
30 See Teles, supra note 25, at 30-41 (on the rise of legal aid within American law 
schools and as a key ethical obligation of American lawyers generally). 
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This institutional and pedagogical apparatus was the product of a powerful, 
generative consensus among legal elites in the late 1960s and early 1970s: 
that ensuring due process and formal equality to those who might otherwise 
go unrepresented was a professional responsibility, indeed, the defining 
collective obligation of lawyers. The term “public-interest work” was no 
accident, for this idea of the profession’s duty owed much to the currency of 
a nonpartisan ideal of the public interest.31 This was a feature of a moment 
of liberal intellectual optimism that the public interest in need of active 
advocacy could be defined as a kind of remainder of democratic pluralism, 
focused on the literally voiceless (values pertaining to the environment) and 
those who lacked organized voice backed by money or institutional heft (such 
as the disorganized poor and consumers). Procedural guarantees seemed an 
intuitive way to bring these otherwise neglected interests into authoritative 
decision-making processes.
The paradigm of legal liberalism has long defined much of public-interest 
law. However, it was put to rest when the Supreme Court, as a means of 
engaging economic exclusion directly, ruled that legislatures faced only ordinary 
rational-basis review of their eligibility criteria for public benefits (1970);32 
that policies bearing unequally on the poor, even with respect to such basic 
interests as education, would also receive only ordinary rational-basis review 
(1973);33 and that policies that predictably and persistently disadvantaged 
African-Americans would also be immune from elevated review as long 
as they were facially neutral and not motivated by racial animus (1976).34 
Described a bit too cynically, the result was a world characterized by pockets 
of individual-level procedural protection, from the guarantee of a criminal 
defense lawyer (often woefully inadequate in substance, especially outside the 
federal courts) to hearings for Social Security disability applicants, combined 
with a sweeping denial of public resources in education, housing, and food, 
and wildly disparate racial and class outcomes in the criminal justice system. 
Procedure and formal equality — the first being, in effect, the institutional 
guarantor of the second — turned out to be inadequate to check either the 
growth or the legal-political amplification of substantive economic inequality, 
and may even have offered the latter a sheen of legitimacy.
None of this means that the program of legal liberalism was conceptually 
misbegotten or somehow inherently an apologia for substantive inequality. 
As Samuel Moyn has recently argued about human rights in wartime, the 
31 Id. at 58-63; Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 yale l.J. 733 (1964).
32 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
33 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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question is strategic and historical more than conceptual.35 In a time when social 
provision seemed to be increasing, economic inequality stable or decreasing, 
and economic and social participation opening to previously excluded groups, 
legal liberalism seemed just the right strategy to press forward a strategy of 
inclusion. It was when the underlying trends failed and receded — when the 
premises of Kuznets and, soon enough, Keynes as well began to shake — 
that procedural advances were left high and dry, as islands of hearings in a 
general desolation.
The most far-sighted legal scholars insisted on the inadequacy of a purely 
formal program of social inclusion where that simply meant incorporating 
individuals into an increasingly unequal economic order.36 Nonetheless, 
much of legal scholarship and most of practical legal activism take their cues 
from the courts and, to a lesser extent, from the paradigms of earlier legal 
successes made salient by memory — whether personal recollection or the 
official memory of the profession, transmitted in the form of classroom legal 
liberalism. In the following decades, public law, exemplarily constitutional law, 
continued to develop in theory and practice the concepts of formal equality 
and procedural protection, while private law became largely the domain of 
increasingly refined arguments over how best to achieve economic efficiency. 
This division of labor made sense on the Kuznets-Keynes premises that, first, 
the otherwise efficient economy was probably not amplifying inequality, and, 
second, if it were, a competent and legitimate state stood ready to redistribute 
wealth in the post-hoc tax-and-transfer scheme long favored by law-and-
economics scholars.37 If, on the contrary, self-accelerating inequality were 
contributing to the undermining of state capacity to make corrective transfers, 
then this division of labor would be mutual, self-imposed blindness: blind 
on the public-law side to the threat that economic inequality posed to legal 
and political equality, and, on the private-law side, blind to the growing 
implausibility of the tax-and-transfer deus ex machina.38
35 Samuel Moyn, Civil Liberties and Endless War, dissenT, Fall 2015, 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/civil-liberties-and-endless-war.
36 Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 harv. l. rev. 4 (1985); Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. aFF. 107
(1976).
37 For a criticism of this conventional approach, see Zachary Liscow, Reducing 
Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity 
as Well as Efficiency, 123 yale l.J. 2134 (2014).
38 The familiar emphasis on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in the economic analysis of 
law, which reserves distributive judgments to post-hoc tax-and-transfer schemes, 
takes its moral plausibility from the premise that tax-and-transfer is practically 
interchangeable with embedded “pre-distributive” policies such as labor law and 
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II. overcomInG InequAlIty: economIc optImIsm In
hIstorIcAl perspectIve
A. A Century of Optimism
The optimism about overcoming scarcity that marked participants in this 
consensus had a key progenitor in John Stuart Mill. In his 1848 Principles of 
Political Economy, Mill argued that the era of money-making and business-
driven busyness that he was living through would prove a historical anomaly.39 
In good time, Mill predicted, people would find their material needs met by 
growing social wealth and would turn to other priorities, especially self-
development and non-instrumental personal relationships. In Mill’s account, 
social life, the realm of relationships defined neither by the self-interested 
instrumental rationality of the marketplace nor by the formality and hierarchical 
authority of politics, would spontaneously implement post-economic, humanistic 
priorities — for no greater, or lesser, reason than that women and men would 
grow sick of money-making and appreciate that they had better things to do 
with their lives. A culture devoted to making money had something wrong 
with it, Mill reckoned, and the perspicacity of free individuals would recognize 
this and set it right.
Keynes’s forecast in his 1930 essay Economic Possibilities for Our 
Grandchildren, that the problem of scarcity might be overcome after another 
century, was an extension of Mill’s argument, augmented by intervening 
decades of compound growth.40 Keynes followed Mill in proposing that, with 
scarcity overcome, the defining question of collective life would no longer 
be how to create wealth, but rather how to use leisure. The most socially 
prized people would be those who showed others gracious, edifying, and 
pleasurable ways to spend their time and powers toward non-accumulative 
ends.41 Keynes even suggested, again echoing Mill (and perhaps waxing a bit 
mischievous), that the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself, having exhausted 
antitrust: that is, both approaches must have the same redistributive potential 
and face the same political-economy barriers to redistribution. The recognition 
that when economic inequality is produced silently, as it were, in the embedded 
distributive scheme of economic life, it both tends to increase and gets translated 
into political power, should be the end of complacency about the prospect of 
post-hoc redistribution. 
39 See John sTuarT mill, PrinCiPles oF PoliTiCal eConomy bk. IV, ch. 6 (1848) 
(favorably forecasting what he calls “the stationary state” of a post-growth 
society).
40 See keynes, supra note 13.
41 See id. at 372.
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its social usefulness, could be handed off with a shudder to experts in mental 
disorders.42 Like Mill, Keynes seemed to imagine that tastes for leisure and 
refinement would assert themselves spontaneously once material needs ceased 
to be pressing. The engine of capitalist wealth-production would cease firing, 
having used up its rude fuel of human cupidity.
By the end of the 1950s, the engine had not even slowed. This was the 
puzzle that Keynesian economist John Kenneth Galbraith set himself to 
examine in one of the twentieth century’s major American social-theoretic 
treatments of wealth and scarcity, The Affluent Society.43 Galbraith argued 
that Keynes’s utopia of leisure had not arrived for two reasons. First was 
the perverse decision to maintain economic insecurity in a wealthy society: 
although the United States was rich enough to provide a decent and secure 
living for all, economic life continued to be shadowed by the prospect of 
vulnerability and deprivation for those who fared badly. Galbraith argued 
that whatever utilitarian rationale these fearsome incentives might have had 
in earlier, poorer eras that needed to make a priority of economic growth, 
such rationales could no longer apply in the age of affluence. The persistence 
of scarcity and economic vulnerability was a kind of collective neurosis in 
economic life — albeit one given a very real material basis by lawmakers’ 
failure to provide security for all Americans in the form of social provision 
and protection in their employment.44
Second, Galbraith sought to explain the unsettling fact that the appetite 
for consumption of material goods had not abated, even as the economy 
provided nearly everyone with levels of material prosperity that, a century or 
even fifty years earlier, would have seemed to solve the problem of material 
want. Here he argued that the advertising industry produced new wants in 
pace with economic production, artificially keeping consumer demand high 
enough to stoke the engines of industry.45 To make this idea coherent, Galbraith 
distinguished between those wants that preceded the production process and 
those wants that were created as a part of the production process itself (the 
latter were described by Galbraith as wants fostered by advertising). He argued 
that human happiness could be promoted just as well by avoiding the creation 
of new wants as by satisfying those wants once they existed: after all, the 
level of satisfaction is a joint product of wants and the extent to which they 
are met, and one may achieve satisfaction as easily by subtracting inessential 
desires as by multiplying means of meeting them.
42 See id. at 369.
43 See John kenneTh galbraiTh, The aFFluenT soCieTy (1958).
44 See id. at 98-120. 
45 See id. at 139-59.
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In Galbraith’s view, growing aggregate wealth was both an achievement 
and a problem; but the problem lay in the fact that Americans had not yet 
matured enough to take full collective advantage of their wealth’s revolutionary 
potential. Galbraith argued that the way to do this would be by legislating, 
rather than simply waiting for, the culture of leisure and refinement that Keynes 
had forecasted.46 The legislation should take the form of social provision in 
personal economic security (job protection and pensions, for example) and 
public goods, the latter cultural as well as infrastructural. This was, in effect, 
the theoretical version of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society: 
a program for a humanistic, post-materialist utopia of lifelong education, 
leisure, reflection, and self-development.47 Galbraith identified a vanguard for 
this change: what he called the New Class, a social stratum whose members 
valued work as a source of intrinsic satisfaction and self-expression, rather 
than a hard bargain of instrumental labor in exchange for the satisfaction of 
wants. This population was already moving into the post-material world of 
satisfaction through activity rather than things, in doing rather than consuming. 
The goal of any affluent society, Galbraith argued, should be to usher as many 
of its people as possible into this class, and so to realize the emancipating 
potential that wealth represented. 
Galbraith’s account, like Rawls’s, rested on the assumption that the Keynesian 
state stood ready and able to realize the potential of affluence to solve the 
problem of scarcity and release people into a post-materialist society. Both 
of these assumptions — the availability of a post-scarcity situation and the 
capacity of the state to usher it in — came under pressure from both left and 
right in the decades following Galbraith’s 1958 book.
B. A Skeptical Turn
1. Doubts from the Left: Positional Goods and the Persistence of Scarcity
In his 1976 Social Limits to Growth, Fred Hirsch, an economist and former
International Monetary Fund official, argued that his era’s (then passing)
optimism rested on a pair of historically contingent assumptions that increasingly
failed to hold.48 Hirsch made a linked pair of arguments. First, economic
growth would not, of its own accord, overcome the problem of scarcity, and it
therefore could not spontaneously make inequality obsolete. Second, economic
growth produced a feedback loop from the economic to the political sphere
46 See id. at 292-307.
47 President Lyndon B. Johnson, The Great Society, Speech at the Univ. of Mich., 
Ann Arbor, Mich. (May 22, 1964).
48 Fred hirsCh, The soCial limiTs To growTh (1976).
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that tended to undermine the role of government in stabilizing or mitigating 
inequality that postwar liberalism assumed. 
a. Positional Goods and the Limits of Growth
Hirsch argued first against the optimist contention that economic growth
would tend automatically to overcome scarcity. Such optimism, he argued,
rested on the assumption that the lion’s share of economic demand would
be for goods that served long-recognized material needs such as food and
shelter. This, however, was an unwarranted extension from earlier periods
of economic history. Economic growth straightforwardly serves needs of
this sort as it progresses, producing more calories, bigger houses with more
bathrooms, more consumer electronics, and so forth. But, Hirsch argued,
economic development brought growing emphasis on positional goods, goods
whose capacity to satisfy their owners or consumers is relative to what others
have.49 Affluence created a paradox: the value of positional goods was eroded
precisely by increasing material wealth, so that the satisfaction produced by
economic growth was often a matter of two steps forward, (at least) one step
back. While Hirsch’s point was rather different from Piketty’s, it similarly
tends to undermine the confidence that increasing social wealth will translate
consistently into better lives — in this case, not directly because of unequal
distribution, but because of the degree and distribution of satisfaction resulting
from growth. In this respect, Hirsch’s analysis casts doubt on a version of
what we have called the Kuznets assumption, and the heart of the general
spirit of economic optimism that we are tracing here: the assumption that
total growth will make most or all lives better.
Positional goods for Hirsch were mainly of two kinds. First — and less 
interesting for present purposes — were material goods subject to congestion, 
such as cars and suburban houses.50 Those goods appeared luxurious when 
few people had them, but turned out to be much less enjoyable when widely 
distributed, precisely because wide distribution meant crowded roads and 
increasingly remote suburbs. Inasmuch as economic growth produces positional 
goods, it constantly undermines its own promise: what one sets out to achieve 
is less satisfying once one finally gets it, because now others have it as well, 
and this “congestion” reduces the material satisfaction that it provides.
Hirsch’s second — and for these purposes more interesting — class of 
positional good is the pure positional good, the thing that is scarce by its 
nature, such as leadership positions or other bases of prestige. Hirsch’s lead 
49 See id. at 27-70.
50 See id. at 36-41. 
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example was higher education.51 As material wealth increases, ever more 
spending flows into competition for positional goods, which do not increase 
in number (at least not in proportion to the increase in overall wealth). With 
increased competition for positional goods, pressure increases on universities 
to serve as sorting institutions, allocating leadership positions, prestige, 
satisfying work, and so forth. Results include longer certifying processes, 
increasing rates of matriculation, (one might add today) rising tuition, and, 
at the heart of the matter, years spent in education that is merely instrumental 
to achieving a positional good, or, even worse, purely defensive — like a 
home-security system, a way of avoiding a loss, the loss in this case being 
a decline in social standing. All these uses of wealth to pursue positional 
goods are, Hirsch argued, mainly social waste. Such waste is unavoidable in 
a materially wealthy society with a highly uneven topography of positional 
goods. Economic growth does not overcome scarcity, but displaces it from 
the material sphere to the positional sphere.
b. Economic Feedback into Government
Hirsch’s second argument pointed to the interaction between capitalism and
democracy, and calls into question what we have called the assumption of
Keynes: that an adequately competent, legitimate, and strong state can be
expected to address such distributive problems as may arise in an economy of
widely shared growth. Hirsch argued that the traditional agenda of economic
development, associated with a broadly utilitarian state (whose policies were
to be laissez-faire under the Benthamite dispensation, managerial in the
Keynesian incarnation), was tenable only because of an indispensable boundary
on the domain of economic self-interest. Individual economic actors were
expected to pursue their self-interest to the full, but always within the rules
of the game, while principled and public-spirited officials were charged with
enforcing those rules in an even-handed fashion. But, Hirsch argued, these
boundaries were unstable. Absent some independent social morality, there
was no reason for people, professions, and industries not to try to manipulate
and alter the rules in their own favor.52 Reciprocally, there was no guarantee
that officials would not put the rules up for sale, if not crudely and nakedly,
then in the familiar, revolving-door style of capture that has become familiar
in the capitalist regulatory state.53 There was reason to expect these trends
to grow more intense as the elevation of economic self-interest as a sole and
sufficient account of rationality eroded what Hirsch (in what might have been
51 See id. at 41-54.
52 See id. at 117-36. 
53 Colin Leys, The Cynical State, 42 soCialisT reg. 1 (2006).
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a specifically British way of envisioning the problem) described as the quasi-
religious social ethics of businesspeople and professionals and the mandarin 
noblesse oblige of public officials. Such extra-market social ethics, Hirsch 
argued, was the implicit sociological linchpin of the regulated market that 
the Keynesian state supported; but the market’s logic tended to undercut this 
sine qua non of its own regulation.
For these reasons, Hirsch argued, political intervention would be necessary 
to create a social state in which prosperity would not undercut its own promise. 
As he put it, the market provides a range of choices to the individual, but only 
politics provides the power to choose among sets of choices, that is, to shape the 
playing field and the rules themselves. Individual choice alone, even powered 
by increased wealth, would not deliver the long-promised escape from scarcity 
and insecurity. There was, of course, an irony in Hirsch’s recommendation. 
The very reasons that egalitarian and market-restricting political intervention 
would become increasingly necessary to win the promised benefits of growing 
social wealth also presented barriers to that intervention, in the forms of 
self-interested economic bids for political influence and increasing effective 
demand to invest in positional goods.
2. From the Right: Doubts About Democracy and Neoliberalism’s Rise
Even as the regulatory state became the assumed linchpin of twentieth-
century political economy, it was losing plausibility as a vehicle of specifically
democratic decision-making. A line of argument widely broadcasted in the
United States by Walter Lippmann and Joseph Schumpeter held that actually
existing mass democracy could not instantiate any robust conception of
collective self-rule.54 Voters were ill-informed, emotional, and often in sway
of fantastical confusion. Majorities were contingent and transitory. Even at its
most lucid, the will of the majority was simply visited on the minority with
the arbitrary decisiveness of authoritarian dictates. The idea that democracy
involved a collectivity deliberately choosing its direction was insupportable
outside certain exceptional and archaic circumstances, such as the Greek
polis or Swiss canton.
On this view, the most optimistic account of democracy that one could 
hope to sustain was that majoritarian elections provided a rule of decision 
54 See, e.g., walTer liPPmann, The PhanTom PubliC (1930) (arguing that existing 
schemes of majoritarian voting do not credibly approximate any plausible account 
of collective self-governance); JosePh sChumPeTer, CaPiTalism, soCialism, and 
demoCraCy 250-83 (Harper Perennial ed., 1975) (1942) (arguing that actually 
existing democracy could be credibly understood only as a system of elite 
rotation).
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to resolve contests among rotating elite factions without resort to violence 
— the position Schumpeter adopted.55 Lippmann took a gentler tone but 
was not much more optimistic, describing popular majorities as weighing 
in occasionally on questions of great moment — not all that rationally, but 
more or less decisively — but otherwise little connected with the activity of 
governance, which was the work of institutions, not populations. The virtue of 
democracy, for these thinkers, was simply its status as a nonviolent procedure 
for determining which elite would control the state.
These arguments first appeared between the 1920s and the 1940s. They 
grew increasingly influential, however, as the period of anomalous economic 
equality began to recede. By the 1970s, a sophisticated body of public-choice 
literature portrayed government as, in effect, a subset of economic life: a 
congeries of rent-seeking by industries and constituencies, power-accumulation 
by bureaucrats, and, at worst, utopian flights of reformist fancy free of the 
discipline that cost-internalization imposes on private decisions.56 Hirsch 
thus wrote in a world in which Galbraith’s rather comfortable assumption of 
a legitimate, effective, and benign state was under considerable intellectual 
pressure. Recognizing the need for regulation was already a matter of reclaiming 
contested ground, not simply bathing in near-consensus.
The most comprehensive, sustained, and — in hindsight — emblematic 
attack from the right on Great Society optimism came from Friedrich Hayek. 
Hayek argued that, contrary to Keynes-style promises of post-material security, 
an economy could do its work only if it maintained a measure of insecurity and 
arbitrariness, and that social provision did not perfect the promise of economic 
development but rather undercut it.57 Hayek proposed that the economy should 
be understood as an information-processing system, conveying data about 
the relative scarcity of goods, time, and talent, and the extent and intensity of 
desire for them.58 Effective communication of this data laid the groundwork 
for rational decisions about the tradeoffs between possible uses of resources 
that are the ligature of economic life. The key to this informational function 
was the price mechanism, which expressed the multifarious facts of economic 
55 The modern idea can be traced to Pareto on the “circulation of elites.” See 
vilFredo PareTo, The rise and Fall oF The eliTes (1991).
56 See sTeven g. medema, The hesiTanT hand 125-59 (2011) (presenting an excellent 
intellectual history of the rise of public choice analysis); see also riChard TuCk, 
Free riding (2009) (raising a philosophical critique and historical overview of 
the foundations of rational choice theory in the social sciences). 
57 See FriedriCh hayek, Social or Distributive Justice, in The essenCe oF hayek 
62 (Chiaki Nishiyama ed., 1984).
58 See FriedriCh hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in The essenCe oF 
hayek, supra note 57, at 211.
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life in uniquely succinct and usable form. Prices could do this work only if 
they were in fact allowed to coordinate decisions about the distribution and 
use of resources: every redistributive or regulatory mandate clogged and 
diverted the flow of information, turning a healthy vascular system of data 
into a swampy delta of drifting decisions. 
The consummation of secure prosperity that Galbraith sketched would 
thus be, in effect, the end of economic life as Hayek described it, and its 
eclipse by the bureaucratic life of an administered state. One could expect 
such a state to be inefficient, arbitrary, and actuated by envious and irrational 
passions, quite unlike the relatively lucid instrumental rationality that the price 
system enforced on market choices. Faced with a choice between liberalism 
— which for him meant the classical economic liberalism of laissez-faire 
— and democracy, Hayek argued, one should prefer liberalism. The further 
democracy developed in the directions that Galbraith and Hirsch urged, the 
more it might force the choice.
On the strength of these arguments, Hayek has become the exemplar of the 
approach to political economy often called neoliberalism. The heart of this 
revival of classical economic liberalism is the claim that there is no viable 
alternative to a capital-friendly market system, and therefore any attempt 
to use state power to shape economic outcomes directly is an error. Less a 
program or system of thought than a constellation of programs united by an 
intellectual style, neoliberalism is sometimes bolstered by the claims that 
markets secure liberty and equality (which Hayek argued), fairness (which 
he did not), or welfare (which he did, but in qualified form). But the heart of 
the neoliberal position is a negative one: there is nothing much for the state 
to do but make and maintain markets. 
As we have argued elsewhere, as a style of argument it also tends to conceal 
the distributive choices inherent in market-making policy, including deciding 
who will be subjected to market discipline, and in what manner — a judgment 
present in everything from the legal construction of labor markets to post-crisis 
bailouts.59 On this view, ambitious political projects will undermine liberty, 
equality, fairness, and welfare together. A market regime is the least-worst 
for all of these values. This is, increasingly, the intellectual mood in which 
revelations of growing inequality have appeared.60
These revelations have changed the intellectual mood of at least the 
mainstream public. However, doubts on both left and right were already 
present in the early 1970s and earlier, though they enjoyed different receptions. 
Positions such as Hirsch’s, which suggested that dynamics internal to democratic 
59 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 14.
60 See Symposium, Law and Neoliberalism, 77 law & ConTemP. Probs. 1 (2014).
Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/23/17 5:57 PM
2017] Inequality Rediscovered 79
capitalism would undermine its promise of widely shared and sustainable 
economic progress, were largely marginalized until Piketty’s empirical findings 
shook a complacency that no theoretical conjecture had been able to budge. 
By contrast, right-wing doubts, as exemplified in Hayek’s work, became part 
of the arsenal of attack on the redistributive ambitions of the postwar welfare 
state. From the release of The Road to Serfdom61 (and its abridgement in the 
April 1945 issue of Reader’s Digest62) Hayek’s thought always had an American 
constituency among those who were never convinced to accept the role of 
government in the mid-century accommodation, the anti-New Deal voters 
who became Goldwater supporters and handed on their legacy to the New 
Right of Ronald Reagan.63 Outside of certain academic subcultures, Hayek’s 
admirers seem to have understood their position in political life and the legal 
profession as one of opposition in the 1970s, even as they found homes in a 
new generation of think-tanks and law-and-economics centers, and then in 
the Reagan-era apparatus of the Republican Party. 
Indeed, over subsequent decades, a Hayekian view of economic life 
has greatly influenced the private-law side of the public-private division of 
intellectual labor sketched earlier. Its influence on the public-law side, along 
with that of Lippmann’s skepticism about democracy and the merger of 
(specific versions of) political and economic thought in public-choice theory, 
forms a complicated story, but the broad outlines are clear. The influence 
of skepticism about the democratic credentials and instrumental efficacy of 
public action helped to erode confidence that the state could, or should, do 
more than pursue market-correcting economic policies. Self-confidence on the 
public side of the public-private split declined as the assumptions of public-
law scholarship came to resemble those of private law, at least with respect 
to the competence and authority of the state. The limitations of our time in 
grappling with economic inequality may thus reflect not only the persistence 
of styles of thought formed by mid-century optimism, but also the denuding of 
a mid-century ambition for government during decades of skepticism. When 
Democrats took power in the United States in 1992 and again in 2008, for 
instance, they took as their main priorities deregulating and then saving the 
financial industry, expanding liberalized trade regimes, and extending health 
61 FriedriCh hayek, The road To serFdom (1944).
62 See angus burgin, The greaT Persuasion 87-89 (2012) (describing the Reader’s 
Digest condensation of Hayek’s book and its widespread public dissemination 
and use by conservative politicians).
63 For two accounts of this history, told from rather different perspectives, see 
angus burgin, The greaT Persuasion (2015), and riCk PerlsTein, beFore The 
sTorm (2001).
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insurance through market-modeled public-private institutions. In so doing, 
they declined a more radical agenda that might have meant pressing for labor 
power, aggressively redistributive public investments, or a mid-century model 
of direct public provision.64 
conclusIon
The recent “rediscovery” of economic inequality presents questions that legal 
practice and scholarship are under-prepared to address, in part because of 
the long shadow cast over both by earlier decades when many supposed that 
inequality had mainly ceased to matter, or was on its way out. This period 
of optimism contributed to a professional culture, legal liberalism, with an 
emphasis on procedural protections and formal rights that, in turn, shared an 
organizing premise with fields ranging from political philosophy to Keynesian 
economics: the remaining problems of distribution involved consolidating 
gains in wealth already achieved and ensuring that previously excluded groups 
enjoyed formal equality of opportunity. Inequality was ceasing to matter, and 
poverty, its final, residual form, would lose its war with the humanitarian state. 
A qualification is worth stressing: of course this characterization sweeps too 
broadly to avoid counter-examples. Not everyone shared in the optimism that 
economic development in a democratic order would make inequality obsolete. 
Recall the significant share of leaders of the 1964 March on Washington who 
considered themselves democratic socialists.65 Moreover, it is important not to 
mistake what we are calling optimism for naivete. From Legal Services lawyers 
to John Rawls, the figures who have served in this Article as exemplars of a 
certain kind of optimism understood their work as emancipatory, whether in 
the openness and fairness of the legal system (including as it shaped social 
provision, the workplace, and the family) or in the understanding of what 
justice required. What marked them as creatures of their time was not a lack of 
transformational vision, but the belief that, however radical the policy means 
of this vision might be, in spirit it consummated the organizing principles of 
their institutions and their era. 
That picture did not depend on a crude idea that Kuznets’s tax-return studies 
adequately described the mechanisms of democratic capitalism: Galbraith, 
64 For a more extensive treatment of these themes, see Grewal & Purdy, supra 
note 14.
65 See, e.g., Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil 
Rights Movement, CommenTary, Feb. 1965, http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/
ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735066227830.pdf (arguing for economic reconstruction 
as the necessary future of the civil rights struggle).
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after all, was the theorist of “countervailing power,” the classic American 
formulation of social-democratic corporatism, in which unions, companies, 
elected officials, and public administrators steered the economic ship in 
semi-agonistic collaboration. What distinguished all of these figures was 
their working supposition, more or less articulate, that widely shared growth 
and mid-century institutions would remain the frame in which emancipatory 
reforms would take life and grow.
We have also sketched a “skeptical” intellectual history, a set of doubts about 
the mid-century accommodation, by way of Hirsch and Hayek. Although both 
figures are symptomatic of discontent with the mid-century accommodation, 
their positions represent alternative accounts of why that accommodation has 
passed. Hirsch’s claim was that contradictions inherent in economic growth 
within a market order both limited progress in the satisfaction of human 
desires and eroded political governance of the economy. Hayek claimed, in 
contrast, that the ambition to govern economic life politically — the shared 
presupposition of Galbraith and Rawls — was incompatible with a liberal 
market order. Both regarded the accommodation named in the term “democratic 
capitalism” as less sustainable than its earlier theorists imagined, but they 
saw the difficulty as emerging from, so to speak, opposite sides of the dyad. 
One of the major questions in today’s political economy is why the forecasts 
of Keynes and Galbraith did not come true. Was it because Hayek’s recuperation 
of market theory, combined with a long-running theoretical demotion of 
democracy, was intellectually right, and sensible policymakers saved the world 
from incipient statism? Or was it because, as Wolfgang Streeck has argued 
in terms that echo and extend Hirsch’s, capital revolted against the broadly 
social-democratic mid-century accommodation that thinkers like Galbraith 
assumed and sought to perfect?66 Put differently, is the surging inequality of 
recent decades a feature of the best of possible worlds, or of a world where a 
relatively egalitarian regime was recently dethroned and political institutions 
have been put to work creating the very market arrangements that produce 
and sustain inequality? Obviously, the stakes of this question are not small. 
They concern whether the inequality-generating logic of economic life limits 
and conditions the possible forms of democracy or, on the contrary, the real 
possibility of democratic decisions about the shape of the economy has been 
suppressed by a counter-democratic revolt of capital — albeit one that might 
have been expected given the dynamics of democratic capitalism.
The worst thought, from the point of view of those who prize relatively 
egalitarian arrangements, is that both branches of skepticism might be right 
66 wolFgang sTreeCk, buying Time: The delayed Crisis oF demoCraTiC CaPiTalism 
(2014).
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about the limits of their respective targets: Hirsch about markets, Hayek about 
government. All such conclusions, however, are likely to be unduly sweeping. 
It seems advisable to keep these broad alternatives in mind while treating 
them also as presenting historical rather than conceptual questions, that is, 
treating them as questions whose answers are likely to come in experience 
that will, in turn, add nuance to the questions.
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